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THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE: INSTIGATING
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW’S CONSIDERATION OF
FORCED MARRIAGE
Valerie Oosterveld*
The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) adopted a significant new
legal approach when it investigated, prosecuted, and convicted individuals
for forced marriage as a gender-related violation of international criminal
law. In The Legal Legacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Prof. Charles
Jalloh discusses how the SCSL addressed the situation of Sierra Leonean
“bush wives”—girls and women who were held in captivity during the civil
war, “without consent or choice,” and assigned to serve, sexually and through
domestic work, their soldier “husbands.”1 The SCSL’s Prosecutor
investigated and prosecuted the violations committed against “bush wives,”
categorizing them as the crime against humanity of “other inhumane acts.”2
As part of this process, the Office of the Prosecutor consulted with former
“bush wives,” who indicated that they wanted the crime to be labelled “forced
marriage,” as they felt that this term accurately described the harms they
suffered.3 The SCSL’s Appeals Chamber, in the Armed Forces
Revolutionary Council (AFRC) case, defined forced marriage as “a
perpetrator compelling a person by force or threat of force, through the words
or conduct of the perpetrator or those associated with him, into a forced
conjugal association with another person resulting in great suffering, or
serious physical or mental injury on the part of the victim.”4 This definition,

*
Professor, University of Western Ontario Faculty of Law (Canada) and member of the Canadian
Partnership for International Justice. The author wishes to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada for its research support.
1 CHARLES C. JALLOH, THE LEGAL LEGACY OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 150, 162
(2020).
2 Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Further Amended Consolidated Indictment,
¶¶ 51–57 (Feb. 18, 2005); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-PT, Corrected Amended
Consolidated Indictment, ¶ 60 (Aug. 2, 2006).
3 Valerie Oosterveld, The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Initial Structural and Procedural
Decisions on Sexual and Gender-Based Violence, 46 CAMBRIAN L. REV. 131, 145−47 (2015−2016).
4 Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-A, Judgment, ¶ 195 (Appeals Chamber Feb. 22,
2008). This approach was also endorsed in Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-A, Judgment, ¶
735 (Appeals Chamber Oct. 26, 2009). Note, however, that the Trial Chamber of the ECCC stated: “The
Chamber notes that the term ‘forced marriage’ has been used in international jurisprudence to cover a
range of different factual circumstances. The Chamber is not satisfied that there exists a common
understanding of this label.” Prosecutor v. Nuon Chea (ECCC Case 002/02 Trial Judgment), Case 002/02
Judgment, Case No. 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC ¶ 743 (Nov. 16, 2018).
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and the SCSL’s subsequent analysis of—and convictions for—forced
marriage in the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) case, has had a significant
and lasting impact on the understanding of forced marriage under
international criminal law (ICL).5
The SCSL’s recognition of forced marriage as a violation of
international criminal law subsequently prompted two significant
developments within the field. First, it led to the prosecution of forced
marriage as an international crime in the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) and the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Second, it led to introspection within the international criminal law
community, creating a deeper understanding of the harms stemming from
forced marriage, and raising questions about the content of, and label for, the
violation. These developments will be examined in turn.
The SCSL’s groundbreaking jurisprudence on forced marriage has been
referred to and relied upon in two tribunals. The ECCC prosecuted
individuals for forced marriage committed during Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge
regime.6 Many men and women were forced by Khmer Rouge state officials
to marry in mass ceremonies, without choice of spouse, and subsequently
coerced to have sex and procreate.7 The Trial Judgment analyzed forced
marriage through the category of other inhumane acts, following the example
set by the SCSL.8 The final Trial Judgment specifically quoted the definition
of forced marriage set out by the SCSL’s Appeals Chamber,9 and ultimately
concluded that: “Individuals . . . ‘consented’ to marriage out of fear,
including the fear or threat of being placed in danger; subjected to various
accusations including opposing Angkar; sent for re-education or
refashioning; being moved to another location; or killed. . . . [T]he consent
given was not genuine.”10 The accused were convicted of the forced marriage
charges.11

5 See, e.g., Valerie Oosterveld, Forced Marriage During Conflict and Mass Atrocity, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GENDER AND CONFLICT 240 (Naomi Cahn, Dina Haynes, Fionnuala Ní Aoláin
& Nahla Valji eds., 2017); Valerie Oosterveld, Forced Marriage and the Special Court for Sierra Leone:
Legal Advances and Conceptual Difficulties, 2 J. INT’L HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUD. 127 (2011)
[hereinafter Oosterveld, Forced Marriage and the Special Court]; Sara Wharton, The Evolution of
International Criminal Law: Prosecuting ‘New’ Crimes Before the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 11
INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 217 (2011); Melanie O’Brien, ‘Don’t Kill Them, Let’s Choose Them as Wives’: The
Development of the Crimes of Forced Marriage, Sexual Slavery and Enforced Prostitution in
International Criminal Law, 20 INT’L J. HUM. RIGHTS 386 (2016).
6 ECCC Case 002/02 Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 3690–994.
7 Id. ¶¶ 3690–91, 3696.
8 Id. ¶¶ 741–49.
9 Id. ¶ 744.
10 Id. ¶¶ 3620 (footnotes omitted), 3623.
11 Id. at Disposition page 2231.
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The ICC has charged two accused with forced marriage, also under the
crime against humanity of other inhumane acts. In Prosecutor v. Ongwen, a
former senior commander in the Lord’s Resistance Army in northern Uganda
was charged with, and convicted of, directly committing, and being
responsible for, a system of “forced exclusive conjugal partners,” under
which abducted girls and women were forced to serve as “wives” within his
brigade in the 2002−2005 time period.12 Citing to the SCSL, the ICC defined
forced marriage as “the imposition, regardless of the will of the victim, of
duties that are associated with marriage – including in terms of exclusivity of
the (forced) conjugal union imposed on the victim – as well as the consequent
social stigma.”13 In Prosecutor v. Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz, the accused, the
former de facto chief of the Islamic police under armed groups Al-Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb and Ansar Dine, is charged with participating in a policy
of forced marriages directed against the female inhabitants of Timbuktu,
Mali, in 2012−2013.14 The Prosecutor argues that these forced marriages led
to repeated rapes, sexual enslavement, and persecution of these women and
girls.15 The Al Hassan trial opened on July 14−15, 2020. The SCSL’s
jurisprudence on forced marriage has played a prominent role in the ICC’s
consideration of forced marriage in both cases.16
The SCSL’s jurisprudence has also prompted scholars to examine the
phenomenon of forced marriage.17 One issue they have explored is the
categorization of victims of forced marriage, since the SCSL defined
victimhood largely in female terms18 and perpetrators as males.19 The focus

12 Prosecutor v. Ongwen (Ongwen Trial Judgment), Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15, Trial Judgment
¶¶ 3026, 3071, 3116 (Trial Chamber IX, Feb. 4, 2021); Prosecutor v. Ongwen (Ongwen Confirmation of
Charges), Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges against Dominic Ongwen
¶¶ 104–17, 136–38 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, Mar. 23, 2016).
13 Ongwen Trial Judgment, ¶ 2748.
14 Prosecutor v. Aziz, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/18, Rectificatif à la Décision relative à la
confirmation des charges portées contre Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud ¶¶ 552–
651 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Nov. 13, 2019).
15 Id. ¶ 563.
16 E.g., Ongwen Confirmation of Charges, at ¶¶ 89, 93.
17 E.g., Valerie Oosterveld, Forced Marriage: Terminological Coherence and Dissonance in
International Criminal Law, 27 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1263 (2019); Neha Jain, Forced Marriage as
a Crime Against Humanity: Problems of Definition and Prosecution, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1013 (2008);
Jennifer Gong-Gershowitz, Forced Marriage: A “New” Crime Against Humanity?, 8 NW. J. INT’L HUM.
RTS. 53 (2009); Patricia V. Sellers, Wartime Female Slavery: Enslavement?, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 115
(2011).
18 E.g., Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-A, Judgment, ¶ 195 (Appeals Chamber Feb.
22, 2008) (“forced marriage implies a relationship of exclusivity between the ‘husband’ and ‘wife,’ which
could lead to disciplinary consequences [of the ‘wife’ by the ‘husband’] for breach of this exclusive
relationship.”).
19 For example, the Appeals Chamber’s definition of forced marriage refers to “the perpetrator or
those associated with him.” Id. (emphasis added).
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of the SCSL was on the “bush wife” phenomenon created by the RUF and
AFRC rebels, in which the victims appearing before the court were girls and
women and the perpetrators were identified as male fighters. As a result, the
analysis by the SCSL was cast in this paradigm of female victims and male
perpetrators, and many commentators have since understandably focused on
this scenario, given the large numbers of female victims of forced marriage
in conflicts around the world.20 The ECCC presented a different scenario, in
which the victims were both male and female, and the perpetrators were male
and female officials of the Khmer Rouge.21 Subsequent research has
indicated that victims and perpetrators of forced marriage may be both female
and male. There may be boys and men forced to become “husbands” who are
coerced into this role through policies aimed at increasing internal
compliance and allegiance to a particular fighting group.22 This research
helps to bring further nuance to the understanding of forced marriage
victimhood, given that “forced marriage as a mechanism of atrocity may
assume different forms in different places.”23 Therefore, Denov and Drumbl
urge a focus on coercion (“imposing a compelled association”) of all affected
parties.24
Another key issue of contention and discussion among commentators
relates to the term “forced marriage.” The Taylor Trial Chamber, and experts
such as Sellers, advocate replacing the term with a legal label that more
accurately captures the harms under consideration, such as “conjugal
slavery” or “slavery” simpliciter.25 The reasons are twofold: first, in cases
20 E.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: Report of the United Nations
Secretary-General, ¶¶ 14, 20, 31, 37, 40, 70, U.N. Doc. S/2020/487 (June 3, 2020).
21 Prosecutor v. Nuon Chea, Case 002/02 Judgment, Case No. 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC ¶¶
3690–94 (Nov. 16, 2018). For an analysis of how the ECCC analyzed male victims of rape within forced
marriages in the Case 002/02 Trial Judgment, see Elinor Fry & Elies van Sliedregt, Targeted Groups,
Rape and Dolus Eventualis: Assessing the ECCC’s Contributions to Substantive International Criminal
Law, 18 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 701 (2020).
22 Denov and Drumbl identify, through ethnographic research, boys and men who were forced into
“marriage” so as to deepen their enmeshment within the Lord’s Resistance Army. Myriam S. Denov &
Mark A. Drumbl, The Many Harms of Forced Marriage: Insights for Law from Ethnography in Northern
Uganda, 18 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 349, 357, 359, 361 (2020). The relationships within the forcibly created
families were rendered “an expression of captivity.” Id. at 361. They also indicate that such individuals
may simultaneously be victims and victimizers. Id. at 366–67; see also Omer Aijazi & Erin Baines,
Relationality, Culpability and Consent in Wartime: Men’s Experiences of Forced Marriage, 11 INT’L J.
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 463 (2017).
23 Denov & Drumbl, supra note 22, at 371.
24 Id. at 367.
25 Prosecutor v. Taylor (Taylor Trial Judgment), Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgment, ¶ 428 (Trial
Chamber II May 18, 2012); Sellers, supra note 17, at 142. See also Zawati, who proposes “marital slavery”
as an alternative label. HILMI ZAWATI, FAIR LABELLING AND THE DILEMMA OF PROSECUTING GENDERBASED CRIMES AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 129 (2014). See also Annie Bunting,
‘Forced Marriage’ in Conflict Situations: Researching and Prosecuting Old Harms and New Crimes, 1
CAN. J. HUM. RTS. 165, 179–80 (2012) (arguing for classification of forced marriage as enslavement).
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where there is no legal union (such as in the “bush wife” context), they feel
that it is a misnomer to refer to the violation as a form of marriage.26 They
argue that the reference to “marriage” in these scenarios obscures the fact that
the victims are, in many circumstances, enslaved.27 Secondly, they express
concern that the reference to “marriage” may unintentionally serve to
legitimate patriarchal understandings of marriage, in which women are
expected to serve men.28 On the other hand, scholars recognize that there is
an important expressive function in the term “forced marriage” for some
victims.29
In sum, the SCSL prompted a major shift in understanding in
international criminal law. As a result of the SCSL’s analysis and subsequent
consideration in other tribunals, forced marriage is comprehended as a
multifaceted set of harms. At the same time, the SCSL’s introduction of
forced marriage has triggered a deeper examination and questioning by
international criminal law scholars and practitioners—a healthy and logical
development meant to ensure that the crime is properly identified and
labelled.

Note that there is also a debate on the harm that is captured by the term “forced marriage”: should the
focus be on the imposition of the status of “marriage” itself, or is it on the constellation of harms that
accompany the imposition of this status (such as sexual slavery, domestic slavery, forced pregnancy,
forced childrearing, etc.)? See, e.g., Oosterveld, Forced Marriage and the Special Court, supra note 5, at
143–48.
26 Taylor Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 425, 427.
27 Sellers, supra note 17, at 142.
28 Oosterveld, Forced Marriage and the Special Court, supra note 5, at 154–55; Binaifer
Nowrojee, Making the Invisible War Crime Visible: Post-Conflict Justice for Sierra Leone’s Rape Victims,
18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 85, 102 (2005).
29 Oosterveld, Forced Marriage and the Special Court, supra note 5, at 138–41; see also Annie
Bunting & Izevbuwa Kehinde Ikhimiukor, The Expressive Nature of Law: What We Learn from Conjugal
Slavery to Forced Marriage in International Criminal Law, 18 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 331, 349–52 (2018).

